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Regulators often face the challenge of designing and implement-
ing rules that both, respond to the policy objectives and that can
be clearly referred to the day-to-day operations and practices in the
marketplace. In many cases, the actual codes end up being a cum-
bersome collection of conditions that are very di±cult to evaluate and
re-design. This paper suggests that some of the most commonly used
tools in Signal Processing could o®er a convenient vehicle for tackling
these di±culties. By starting from a SIMULINKr model of the
regulation of Banco de Mexico on the foreign exchange transactions
of commercial banks, this papers o®ers an example of how those tools
could be used in this context.
Introduction
Regulators often face the challenge of designing and implementing rules
that both, respond to their policy objectives and that can be clearly referred
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1to the day-to-day operations and practices in the marketplace. In many
cases, specially in the areas of taxation, payment systems and regulation
of ¯nancial intermediaries, the actual codes end up being a cumbersome
collection of de¯nitions, conditions, restrictions and cross-references that, ex
post, are very di±cult to evaluate and ¯ne tune.
One way of tackling this problem would be to try to write down every
equation implied by the existing regulation in order to get to a closed form
solution that could help in assessing its e®ects. The problem with this ap-
proach is that most regulations include various forms of discontinuities and
non-linearities that rarely have a closed form solution. An alternative would
be to use the structural form to run simulations and from there work through
some optimization method to improve the rules, i.e. by sequentially exclud-
ing equations or by recursively calibrating some of the parameters. This
approach has the disadvantage of presenting the policy maker with too many
parameters to look at, leaving him not very sure about the ¯nal outcome of
any ulterior regulatory reform.
From this perspective, I believe that the tools that economists commonly
use for designing optimal policies o®er little relief to practitioners, specially
when dealing with regulatory design.
In fact, taking this on a practical stand, one thing is to deal with a
abstract maximization exercise where the idea is to ¯nd the best path or
reaction function for a control variable it; and a very di®erent one, when the
government sets speci¯c rules for the way in which individual agents interact
among them and with its agencies. In the ¯rst situation, one could com-
fortably rely on dynamic programming techniques, whereas the complexity
of the second is more analogous to the design of complex dynamic systems
where a series of inputs come together, are added, lagged, or combined to get
an output.1. In fact, the alluded tools have some noteworthy advantages:
They have been thought for large and complex dynamic systems They
are commonly used improving the design of complex devices running
from microprocessors to automobiles or aircrafts.
Robust visualization tools Resources such as periodograms, zero-pole plots,
frequency response, system response and impulse response functions,
1Notwithstanding, for many commonly used dynamic programming models in Eco-
nomics, one could ¯nd a direct relationship between the Euler equations and Linear Time
Invariant Filters. Some examples can be found in Reynoso [12]
2o®er a set of visualization tools that help to understand the basic con-
struct of a system without an explosive use of parameters.
Well developed computational algorithms There are a large number of
algorithms at hand that facilitate the computation and simulation of
complex dynamic system, back and forth the time and frequency do-
mains.
This paper uses the Banco de Mexico regulation of foreign exchange trans-
actions of comercial banks as an example of how these tools could be used in
the context of ¯nancial sector regulation. Section 1 presents the background
of such regulation; Section 2 shows the SIMULINKr representation of
the regulation that will be used as the kernel for all simulations. Section
3 analyzes the regulation looking, ¯rst, at its implicit regulatory costs, and
then at its dynamic properties in the time and frequency domains. Section 4
explores issue of de¯ning the criteria for improving the regulation and ¯nding
an implementable solution.
1 A background on the reserve requirements
in foreign exchange in the Mexican Bank-
ing System
1.1 The changing role of commercial banks in Mexico's
¯nancial crises in the seventies and eighties
Mexico has experienced several external ¯nancial crisis over the last 25
years. Even though the ¯nancial rami¯cations of each collapse have hit the
banking sector in every instance, the role of the banks as vehicles for the
propagation and ampli¯cation of the shocks has been di®erent thorugh time
2.
In the mid-seventies, the banking sector was small and overly regulated
along the most traditional lines of the ¯nancial repression literature [7].
Borrowing and lending rates were ¯xed by the authorities; banks had to
meet lending quotas to speci¯c sectors, and the reserve requirements set
2For a good summary see Aspe [1] for an account of the recent crises and Cavazos [4]
for a background on the evolution of the Mexican banking sector
3by the Central Bank were in fact the preferred instrument to ¯nance the
government de¯cit. Banks were signi¯cantly constrained in their operations
in foreign exchange, limited basically to currency exchange and payments. In
this environment, the 1976 peso devaluation, only had an e®ect on the banks
to the extent that they lost some deposits due to capital °ight, however this
drain was promptly accommodated by Banco de Mexico. Furthermore, to
the extent that both, the government and the commercial banks had few
liabilities abroad, the adjustment of the balance of payment disequilibrium
proceded along the lines of a current account correction via the depreciation
of the real exchange rate and an economic slowdown.
In the early eighties the impact and role of banks was di®erent. They
were allowed to take loans from abroad; to take dollar denominated deposits
from the public 3, and to make loans in dollars. Borrowing and lending rates
were gradually freed and, specialized banks merged into institutions that had
a wider range of borrowing and lending activities. However, this ¯rst round
of liberalization of the industry was not accompanied by any sort prudential
rules. On the foreign exchange area, no provision was set to prevent banks
from taking large uncovered positions, specially in a context where people
could shift their peso deposits into dollar checking accounts on sight. 4.
Resulting from this circumstance, the most noticeable consequence of the
series of devaluations occurring throughout 1982, was 5 a partial default via
a forced conversion of the dollar deposits into peso deposits at an exchange
rate below the market rate 6. Also, when the government defaulted on its
debt, the commercial banks which had accumulated a signi¯cant external
debt of its own, found themselves incapable of rolling over any of it. Adding
to the liquidity crunch, one has to also think of the large exchange losses
that had to happen back then. However, their exact size and the mechanism
through which they were absorbed is less clear, because banks were taken
over by the government with nationalistic overtones, for what became, de
facto, a comprehensive bailing-out of an insolvent banking sector.
During the rest of the eighties, the balance sheet of the government-owned
commercial banks shrunk signi¯cantly, therefore limiting its capacity to am-
plify any shock. The government remained as it primary client, and their
3Referred in the literature as mex-dolares
4This had to do in part with the fact that the o±cial exchange rate policy could not
acknowledge an eventual devaluation, for it was based on a ¯xed exchange rate regime
5See Rogers [14], Blanco and Garber [2], Ortiz [10] and Dornbusch and Reynoso [6]
6This means less pesos per dollar vis µ a vis using the market rate
4range of operations was reduced again by forbidding any dollar transactions
with the general public.
In ¯rst years of the nineties were marked by Mexico's restored access to
the international ¯nancial markets. This was true for both, the government
and the banks. Also at the time, the government launched and ambitious
program to modernize the economy. The privatization of the banking sector
was part of this endeavor 7.
As a part of the actions taken to have the banks ready for sale, Mex-
ico's ¯nancial authorities took signi¯cant steps to change the way in which
monetary policy was conducted, as well as to rede¯ne the basic pruden-
tial regulation for these institutions. On the monetary policy side, Banco
de Mexico moved away from a reserve-requirement-based framework for the
management of monetary aggregates (and for funding the de¯cits), and de-
cided to rely solely on open market operations 8. On the credit side, the
basic Basle-type standards became the backbone of the prudential regulation
established by the Ministry of Finance.
Banks were allowed to carry out operations in foreign exchange with other
intermediaries at home and abroad and with corporations inside the country,
with no further limitation than the ones implied by the capitalization rules.
Taking deposits from the public and lending to them in foreign exchange,
remained o® limits.
1.2 The propagation of the 1994-1995 crisis through
the banking system
Mexico's 1994 crisis is marked by the sudden suspension of re-¯nancing
°ows for both, the public and the private sector. The consequences of this
situation hit the banking sector to an extent that sent it to bankruptcy for
the second time in 20 years, at a price tag that exceeded US$80bn, almost
15% of GDP.
There is a consensus among analysts that the holes in the prudential
regulation, compounded by a loose enforcement, brought about unexpected
complications in the handling of the already serious macroeconomic situation
7See Teichman [16] and Rogozinski [15] for a more general discussion on privatization
in Mexico, and Ortiz [9] and Haluk and Navarro [17] on the speci¯cs of bank privatization
8The annual reports of Banco de Mexico during the period 1991-94 have a very thorough
and interesting description of how these operational changes came about
5during the ¯rst quarter of 1995. Ex-post, the banks and the government found
out that the former had failed to hedge a sizeable foreign exchange exposure
and had most of their liabilities maturing in a few days.
The full propagation of the crisis through the ¯nancial industry took
several months, with changing characteristics as time went by.
The ¯rst symptom was a liquidity crush. Right after the authorities an-
nounced the ¯rst so called "small devaluation" in December of 1994, the
international markets reacted casting serious doubts about the capac-
ity of the government to repay short-term dollar-indexed peso-bonds 9,
which in turn lead to a sudden stop in capital °ows into Mexico. At the
time, the commercial banks had most of their liabilities in the form of
interbank credit lines and callable-structured loans 10.When the °ows
of ¯nancing from abroad stopped, not only banks found themselves
unable to roll-over their credit lines, but needed additional funding to
repay the contingent obligations, already deep in the money.
From Banco de Mexico's point of view, this was nothing but a run on
the Mexican banks with the caveat that it was not being performed by
domestic depositors but by banks from abroad. In contrast to what
happened back in 1982, the authorities decided to avoid defaulting to
the largest possible extent. Under these circumstances, it was clear
that the Central Bank could not rely on simply extending their peso
credit lines; therefore the run was ultimately taking place on its own
foreign exchange reserves.
After realizing that the government soon had to roll over close to 35
billion US $, plus another 9 billion US $ from the banking sector, the
mini-devaluation became a maxi-devaluation, when Banco de Mexico
had no other choice but leaving the foreign exchange market in order
to keep its scant reserves to stand behind these liquidity needs.
With respect to the needs of the banks, the Central Bank implemented
a dollar denominated last-resort credit facility to support those in dis-
tress. At some point, as much as 3,800 US $ 11 were drawn through
this special purpose window.
9Known as Tesobonos
10Contingent liabilities which typically included clauses that made them callable de-
pending of the price of an underlying security
11See Banco de Mexico's Annual report for 1995 [5], page 82
6Then came the exchange rate losses. It is fair to say that some pre-
existing regulation put in place by the Central Bank in 1992 mitigated
the size of the losses 12 stemming from the drop in the exchange rate.
Banks were required them to limit long or short positions in foreign ex-
change to 5% of their statutory basic capital. It was later realized that
this rule had the shortcoming of not including in the de¯nition of a short
position the contingent component of the alluded structured-loans. As
a result, when the circumstances made those liabilities callable, and the
time came to mark them to market, substantial losses became evident,
hitting this time the solvency of the banking institutions. The problem
took a while to show up in their balance sheets, but when it did, it was
not only sizeable but generalized.
Finally; came the avalanche of bad loans. Whereas the ¯rst two stages
took place fairly sooon, the last part of the collapse of the banking sec-
tor happened along several months, as the Mexican economy shrank at
a pace unseen since the Great Depression. Thousands of loans became
non-performing, eating up the capital and forcing a large scale rescue
operation.
1.3 Policy response
In Mexico, the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance regulate and
supervise banks concurrently, although each one specializes in some areas.
Banco de Mexico oversees matters related to the payments system, such as
clearing in the securities and interbank credit markets; and transactions in
foreign exchange. In turn, the Ministry of Finance, through its Securities
and Exchange Commission, issues and enforces the rules related to capital
adequacy and accounting principles. This paper paper focuses on the direc-
tives issued by Banco de Mexico, and therefore on the policy response to
what happened in the ¯rst stage of the 1994 ¡ 95bankingcrisis. For further
reading on the policy response to the exchange and loan portfolio loses of the
banking sector, a list of references can be found in Reynoso [11].
For regulators in Banco de Mexico , the 1994 crisis underscored the fact
that their responsibility with respect to the payments system, was to be
12Regulatory letter 2/92
7able to always ensure the convertibility13 of the instruments that enter their
de¯nition of monetary aggregates across them and across currencies.
Right when the authorities had to make a number of important changes
in the operational framework for conducting monetary policy, and when they
were about to pick an exchange rate regime,14, it was already clear to them
that guaranteeing a successful convertibility required to substantially improve
the capacity of banks to meet their funding needs in foreign exchange under
conditions of stress.
It also became clear that the discussion about regulating the foreign ex-
change transactions, and the modalities of the foreign exchange rate regime
were two sides of the same issue. That is , if the banking system was weak and
institutions were rationed in their access to funding in dollars, the Central
Bank will have to play the role of lender of last resort in the hard currency
anyway. Therefore, even if the local currency was allowed to °oat freely,
Banco de Mexico would have to hold international reserves to support insti-
tutions in distress when needed. Hence, whether they wanted or not, it was
very likely that central bank interventions in the foreign exchange market
would take place in a way similar to what one would see in a dirty °oating:
that is, dollars would be supplied into the market by the Central Bank in
times of ¯nancial stress.
Once all this was realized, regulators needed to set the guidelines for
handling the risk of a bank run in foreign exchange. Here they had basically
two alternatives:
Deal with credit needs in dollars in the same way as in pesos . Af-
ter all, if money was fungible and all markets are interconnected, there
should be no reason for making a distinction between the operations
in either currency. In this case, the Central Bank would need to deter-
mine an adequate level of international reserves as well as some rules
for granting and charging for the loans when used.
Establish a sort of exchange controls on banking transactions. This
is, looking for a way in which the reserves of liquidity in foreign ex-
change could be built at the level of each individual bank.
13Understanding this word in the sense of the previous paragraph and not as a synonym
for a Currency Board.
14See Carstens and Gil Diaz [3] as well as the 1994 and 1995 annual reports of Banco
de Mexico
8In deciding which one of the two approaches to follow, the authorities were
making an implicit assessment on the situation of the commercial banking
system.
For instance, it could be argued that the model of a permanent dollar
discount window, would badly serve its purpose in a context of weak banks.
This is because they would have substantial incentives to take large risks, like
betting on the appreciation of the real exchange rate and the drop in interest
rates, to meet their large accrued and/or undergoing losses. A solution like
this would further transfer the downside costs to the Central Bank. This
would also imply subsidizing the worst banks at the expense of those with a
higher commitment with risk management.
Now, although the second model had the advantage of transferring the
cost to each individual bank, it was likely to limit the access to genuine
business opportunities by the better banking institutions. Also, there was
the challenge of setting rules that were progressive (i.e.that would impose a
heavier burden on riskier institutions; simple and enforceable. In addition, in
this case, like with managing any other regulation based on quotas, the au-
thorities would also have to cope with numerous forms of elusion and evasion.
This, would also open the door to discretionarily responses of regulators to
exceptions and market innovation.
After this debate, the authorities opted for the second approach by is-
suing the regulatory letter known as 2019/95. The next sections pursue its
description and analysis.
2 A description of the reserve requirement
rules using SIMULINKr
So far we have taken a look at the problem and at the objectives that
the Central Bank wanted to achieve. We are yet to see how the authorities
executed their intended plan.
The regulatory circular 2019/95 issued by Banco de Mexico15, through
its section M.1, subsections M.13 and M17 16; section M.5, subsections M.51
15The full text of this circular is available on the Internet at the following ad-
dress: http://www.banxico.org.mx/dDisposiciones/FSDisposiciones.html. Also, a well
commented description of this regulation can be found in Hernandez [8]
16These sections have to do with general de¯nitions of assets, and liabilities; rules for
compensation of assets and liabilities and the corresponding reporting rules
9and M.52 17; and section M.6, subsections M.61 and M.63 18, implements the
mechanism that Central Bank regulators thought was the most ¯t to address
the risk of runs in foreign exchange.
As it happens with most regulatory directives, the 2019/95 has plenty of
cross-references and a number of constraints between variables de¯ned from
other variables, making it a somewhat dense piece to analyze. Hence, from
a methodological standpoint, the challenge consists of trying to develop a
structured framework to e®ectively evaluate what the government is actually
doing.
At this point, we will start using tools speci¯cally developed for design-
ing and understanding relatively large and complex dynamic systems, like
SIMULINKr, and its Digital Signal Processing Module.
2.1 Notation
This section describes the content of the relevant sections of the 2019/95
directive in terms of di®erence equations and a number of constraints. Con-
ceptually, one could think of the set of rules as a ¯lter that transforms some
input signals, in this case, funding and lending in foreign exchange by com-
mercial banks; into their observed dollar book.
The representation of this rules borrows the notation widely used in the
Signal Processing literature, in terms of signals and blocks.
Figure 1 lists the blocks used in this paper. They have been grouped in
three categories.
The sources , In general, they are thought as sequences of independently
distributed random variables.
The operators , corresponding to the usual de¯nitions of "Delay n", as
the lag operator for n periods; "Gain", equivalent to scaling the signal
by a given factor; "Integrator", it being the operator that shows the
cumulative sum of the value of the signal at each moment; "Sum", the
arithmetic sum or substraction of the value of two or more signals at
each node; the "Minmax" operator, is the which sets constraints of the
kind max[ ] or min[ ]; and "Mux" (for multiplexing) and "Demux"
17Regarding derivatives and other contingent claims
18Dealing with foreign exchange uncovered positions
10(for de-multiplexing) operators which facilitate the grouping and un-
grouping of signals in the implementation of the model.
The output sinks , that either send the resulting signal from one sub-
system to another; "Out n", or portray the ¯nal output in the time
















Figure 1: Building blocks
2.2 The SIMULINKr model
Figure 2 is a system which has two built-in sub-systems. Looking ¯rst at
the larger picture, one could see thatthe starting point chosen by regulators
was to classify assets and liabilities by maturity and by quality. Then, they
would try to match both sides of the balance sheet by both criteria. To
achieve this goal, they introduced 5 de¯nitions whose precise meaning follows
from inspecting Figure 2:
Net Position Di®erence between total assets in foreign exchange minus to-
tal liabilities in foreign exchange.
RAL 19 This a weighted average of the foreign exchange liabilities. The
weighing factors are inversely proportional to their time to maturity.











































































































2GAP The maximum of the di®erences between assets and liabilities ordered
by maturity class.
Phasing-in coe±cient Since banks could not meet the standards set by
the rules at the outset, regulators mitigated its impact by applying
some "phasing-in" coe±cients to the GAP and RAL de¯nitions.
Reserve requirement Corresponds to the output signal in Figure 2.
Sub-system #1 in ¯gure 3 shows the way in which the regulation classi¯es
assets by maturity date. The rules see three types of assets. First, the lending
portfolio in foreign exchange, then the so called Money market assets; which
are all kinds of tradeable securities denominated in foreign exchange, and
¯nally, the liquid assets, being them deposits in top rated banking institutions
incorporated in a G7 country and short term US Treasury issues. All assets
are classi¯ed by their maturity dates and then used to determine the GAP,







































Figure 3: Assets under Regulation 2019/95
Sub-system #2 in ¯gure 4 shows the dynamics of liabilities implied by
the rules. In contrast with the way in which assets are treated, there is no
distinction in terms of quality. However, the rule tries to make sure that all



































Figure 4: Liabilities under Regulation 2019/95
Now, several years into the operation of this regulation both, regulators
and banks have tended to agree that the 2019/95 had somehow contributed
to reduce the vulnerability of banking institutions to the volatile funding
environment that most emerging economies had been facing. However, there
has also been the sentiment that these rules tend to exaggerate the level of
required reserves 21 and to amplify the day-to-day °uctuations in the foreign
exchange market.
In the next section we will try to assess to what extent this sentiment
can be substantiated. By experimenting with the system of ¯gure 2, we will
try to visualize the implications of its design.
3 Analyzing the properties of rule 2019/95
In understanding a regulation like this, one could bene¯t from experi-
menting with the system. That is, by comparing various input sequences
20It is beyond the reach of this document to discuss how this is done, however it should
be mentioned that there are so many varieties of contingent contracts written between
intermediaries, some of them rather complex, that the authorities have had their share
of surprises when ¯nding some ex-post unanticipated losses in intermediaries who were
thought to be marking to market properly.









































































Figure 5: Base Case System
and its respective outputs, one could make inferences about its properties as
a ¯lter. Therefore, the task for this section is:
² First, to de¯ne a base case scenario, this will be the one with no reg-
ulation; and an alternative scenario, which captures the e®ects of the
regulation.
² Second, de¯ne a set of simulations. Each simulation will input data
from di®erent generating processes, with the purpose of highlighting
the properties of the system from diverse and complementary angles.
² Third, use the comparison between the base case and current system
to design an improved ¯lter.
For reference throughout this document, we will think of the current
model as the one in ¯gure 2; whereas the system structure for the un-regulated
scenario is shown in ¯gure 5.
As for the simulation parameters for both models such as lag orders and
gain factors, we will keep the ones that appear on each of the respective
graphs, except for the properties of the input series which will be modi¯ed
15along the lines hinted above. Finally, the algorithm used for running these
simulations will be the Dormand-Prince with ¯xed-steps in round.22
3.1 First set of simulations: assessing the cost to banks
The purpose of the ¯rst round of simulations is to get an idea of how
costly this regulation is to the banks. To that end we specify the input data
generating processes for loans l
n and funding f
n, as independent draws from
max[0;N s (0;¾)] (1)
for all l and f, where n is the simulation step; l = f1;8;30;60g is the index
for the term structure of loans, and f = f1;8;30;60g the respective index for
the ¯nding variable. The burden of this regulation is de¯ned by the di®erence

































Figure 6: Simulated Reserves (Liquid Assets)
between the funding costs and the return that banks get on their liquid
investments in high quality paper and deposits in top rated institutions.
22For further detail see the technical documentation of SIMULINKr
16Given the fact that it has not been unusual to see the funding 23 of Mexican
banks priced at least one hundred basis points above the United Mexican
States (UMS) sovereign issues, in this section we will take spread over US
Treasuries to be around 500 basis points.
Figure 6 presents the simulated levels of liquid reserves for the normalized
case where ¾ = 1 for 500 steps. At glance, the rule induces a signi¯cant
holdings in low yield assets.

























Figure 7: Mean Level of Reserves and Position under di®erent scenarios of
underlying volatility
Here, one could mention that for relatively extended periods between
devaluations, holding a long position vis-a-vis Mexican assets has represented
relatively high costs to those who have them. This due to the process of real
appreciation of the exchange rate between the crises, as well as resulting
from the e®ect of high real interest rates in pesos, typical of the post and
pre-devaluation times. In spite of that, and resulting from the fact that,
ex-post, a long position covers the devaluation risk, we will omit the carry of
such long position in the computation of the cost to banks. Notwithstanding,
23Non-securitized or non-collaterallized interbank loans
17this variable will be revisited in section 3.3, in the context of the impact of
the regulation on the foreign exchange market.
Figure 7 shows the comparison between the average level of liquid assets
in the free and regulated cases, for di®erent values of the standard deviation
¾ = ¾l = ¾f, 2.
Figure 7 shows the tax implicit in regulation 2019/95, expressed as a
proportion of the statutory capital of the banking system 24. The plots
display its value as a function of the underlying variance of the fundamental
input signals 25. The ¯rst panel contains the average level of reserves resulting







The ¯rst fraction on display in the second panel of ¯gure 2; the second
one is set to 1
:08, and the last component is the assumed cost of carrying these
reserves. The numbers that come out of this simulation, when seen in terms
of a reasonable rate of return on the capital behind the dollar books of a
banking institution, is far from negligible. In fact, it could range anywhere
between 15%to 25% of a reasonable gross rate of return.
3.2 Second set of simulations: performance under stress
The next question to address is on the form in which this regulation covers
the risk of a run. To that end the input signals of ¯gure 2 are speci¯ed as
step processes with the values shown in table 1:
Input signals n ¸ 1 n ¸ 8 n ¸ 30 n ¸ 60
funding
f = 1 1 1 1 1
f = 8 0 1 1 1
f = 30 0 0 1 1
f = 60 0 0 0 1
loans
l = 1;8;30;60 0 0 0 0
Table 1: Parameters for the input step sequences
24Tier 1 capital set at 8% of total assets
25Each kind of assets and liabilities in ¯gure 2 is de¯ned as a fundamental input signal
18The results are shown in ¯gure 8. The light line in the upper panel
corresponds to the amount of required liquid assets by the regulation, whereas
the heavy line shows the outstanding level of liabilities at each point in time.
The lower panel displays the ratio of liquid assets to total liabilities.
Two facts can be highlighted. First, the regulation covers a large propor-
tion of all liabilities with a maturity of 60 days or less with low-yield riskless
assets. Second, the proportional coverage is not very di®erent for 8, 30 and
60 day maturity liabilities. The latter implies that the rule imposes essen-
tially the same burden to banks with relatively di®erent maturity pro¯les. It
also points at the notion that the rule may be unnecessarily complicated if
its compared to an alternative one which simply would state to hold a certain
proportion of all 60 day or less liabilities.



















Required Reserves to Total Liabilities
Figure 8: Coverage of Liabilities by Reserves
193.3 Third set of simulations: looking at the dynamic
properties of the rule
3.3.1 Notation for a Fourier Analysis
It can be shown that for the parameters and structure of the system in
¯gure 2, the box that connects the input and output signal behaves like a
Linear Time Invariant (LTI) ¯lter 26. What will makes a Fourier represen-
tation of this LTI ¯lter useful is that the convolution operation implied by
the system, is mapped to multiplication. In addition, the Fourier transform
for discrete time signals will provide us with an insightful way to interpret
the system.
For notational purposes lets de¯ne the sequence y(n) to be the output
series, x(n) to be the input series and h(n) the unit impulse-response sequence
of the system, for ¡1 < n < 1. Lets also de¯ne the discrete-time Fourier










In general, Z(ej!) is complex valued and depends on the frequency ! of
the complex exponential. Thus, it can be written in terms of its real and
imaginary parts or in terms of its magnitude, jZ(ej!j ; and phase, Áh(!): 27
26This means that if all inputs are multiplied by a scalar, the output will also be mul-
tiplied by the same scalar. Also, if the input series is shifted (to the right or left), the
output series is also shifted in the same phase and direction. Another way to say this
is that when a signal is passed through a LTI ¯lter, it shows only a change in complex
amplitude with no change in phase




















The analysis in the following paragraphs is built on the fact that the
Fourier transform of the unit impulse-response sequence can be obtained
from the Fourier series of the input and output sequences. Starting from the
de¯nition of convolution,




































we can see that the Fourier transform of the output series is the product





21Also, from the fact that the Power Spectra (phase) of the regulation could
be obtained from the ratio (di®erences) of the Power Spectra (phases) of the








Áy(!) = Áx(!) + Áh(!) (4)
3.3.2 The simulation results
Figure 9 shows the simulation results of the reserve requirements in foreign
exchange for a data generating processes which considers draws from a N s
(0;1) for all l and f. The upper panel displays the sequence for the case where
regulation 2019/95 is present. The lower panel is the base case scenario.





























Figure 9: Reserves in foreign exchange
In tirn, ¯gure 10 has the input and output signals for the dollar net
position, where a positive number stands for a long position in dollars. As
we suggested in section 3.1, the regulation induces the intermediaries to hold
in average, larger long positions. Also, both, the reserves and the net position
22variables seem to show more amplitude and persistence in the scenario with
the regulation present. These features can be perceived more clearly if we
transport these sequences to the frequency domain.






























Figure 10: Net position in foreign exchange
3.3.3 The frequency response sequence
Figure 11 shows the power spectrum of the input and output series of
dollar reserves. For convenience, the x axis is presented in cycles per day.
Hence, the closer a value is to the origin, the lower the frequency of the
periodical component.
The inspection of the two spectra con¯rms what has been said all along:
on the one hand, regulation 2019/95 tends to introduce signi¯cant persis-
tence, particularly in the components with 5 days to 1 month persistence.
Secondly, it ampli¯es both, the low and high frequency harmonics.
Figure 12 has the frequency response of the regulation on the net forex
position. The pattern is essentially the same as the one shown by the reserves
variable: the appearance of low frequency harmonics and the ampli¯cation
of the high frequency waves.
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Figure 11: Power Spectrum for Reserves
It is true that latter may look like a necessary evil: after all the 2019/95
rule aims at having banks to build up their own reserves in foreign exchange
in face of short term funding shocks. However, it can also be seen as a
negative side e®ect of the rule. In fact, one has to bear in mind that the net
position of banks can also be seen as their net demand in the foreign exchange
market. Having a participant in this market with such a regulation-induced
demand could hardly contribute to a more stable price of the currency in
normal times. We will come back to this topic in the next section.
A useful way of representing the above information is given by ¯gures 13
and 14. They have the ratios of the power spectra of the output and input
series. According to equation (3), these ratios are equivalent to the square
of the magnitude of the frequency response of the ¯lter that transforms the
input signal into the output signal.
This magnitude is the gain that the ¯lter applies to each of the harmonics
that compose the input series. Here we see again how the structure of the rule
not only ampli¯es short term shocks, but also adds magnitude and persistence
to the shocks that a®ect the net position , which in turn would be likely to
add low frequency waves into the dynamics of the exchange rate.
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Figure 12: Power Spectrum for Position
3.3.4 The impulse-response function
The relationship between a Fourier transform and a z-transform allows
one to take yet another look at the time domain properties of a ¯lter like
regulation 2019/95.
For notation purposes, lets see expression ( 5) as the z-transform of the






From inspection it follows that V (z) is the discrete time Fourier transform
of the sequence rnv(n). Conversely, the z-transform of v(n), evaluated on
the unit circle z = 1 corresponds to its Fourier transform.
Now, take h(n) to be the unit sample response of the system, and H(z)
to be its z - transform, referred onwards as the system function. Lets say
































Figure 13: Magnitude of the frequency response for Reserves



























Figure 14: Magnitude of the frequency response for Net Position





k=1 1 + ®kz¡k
which is known to be the z transform of a linear constant coe±cient




a(k)y(n ¡ k) =
q X
k=0
b(k)x(n ¡ k) (7)
where x(n) and y(n) are the input and output signals respectively.
26The roots of the numerator polynomial in equation ( 6), ¯k are referred
as the zeros of H(z) and the roots of the denominator polynomial,®k as the
poles. To the extent that the ¯ and ® provide a concise representation of the
system function up to a constant, the zero-pole plot can be a useful tool for
analysis. Conventionally, the poles are represented as "x" and the zeros as
"o".28






























time unit: one day
Figure 15: Unit impulse response for Reserves
The upper panel of Figure 15 displays the zero-pole plot for the ¯lter
that transforms the reserves signal. The lower panel is the impulse response
polynomial h(n). Focusing on the zero-pole results, it is worth mentioning
that:
² All poles lie inside the unit circle, meaning that the system is stable
and causal.
² The complex poles and zeros occur in complex conjugate pairs resulting
from the fact that h(n) is real valued.
28The region of convergence (ROC) for the z-transform is, in general, an annulus of the
form ® <j z j< ¯. If ® = 0, the ROC may also include the point z=0; if ¯ = 1, then the
ROC may also include in¯nity
27² Most zeros and poles are very close to the unit circle, which is typical
of minimum phase systems. This implies that the frequency response
of the system can be described only in terms of its magnitude jH(ej!)j.
² Looking at the plot in a counterclockwise direction we con¯rm what
we already know. Deriving from the fact that he ¯rst pole on the unit
circle is closer to the horizontal axis than the ¯rst zero. we know that
the system has a component that has a bigger spectral power at very
high frequencies. Also, to the extent that the second pair of a zero
and a pole on the unit circle shows the same order, and given that the
separation between the two of them is similar, the ¯lter shows a larger
power spectrum at lower frequencies.
Taking a look now at the impulse-response plot, again we see two cyclical
components arising, one with the larger amplitude with a period of about
40 days, and a second with a period of more or less 30 days. Furthermore,
transitory shocks show some impact even after 180 days.
Finally, we end this section by looking at ¯gure 16 with the zero-pole
plot and impulse response of the rule for the net position variable. Although
the results are very similar to the ones in ¯gure 15:
































time unit: one day
Figure 16: Unit impulse response for Position
28² The zero-pole plot shows a pair of zeros and poles on the horizontal
axes that appear in conjugate reciprocal pairs. This is characteristic of
an allpass ¯lter.
² Moving again in the counterclockwise direction, wee see the zero farther
away in terms of an angular distance than the pole. This translates into
a higher spectral power for smaller frequencies. Now, from the fact that
the zero and pole located in the middle of the arc formed by the unit
circle and each quadrant, are more to the center of such arc than in
¯gure 15, we could think that the power contribution of the ¯lter at
lower frequencies is somewhat more moderated in the case of the net
position variable, than in the case of reserves.
4 Improving the ¯lter design: patching the
regulation
Although we are hardly at a point where we could generalize any observa-
tion on the way the risk management policy of the Mexican authorities works,
one could not avoid noticing that in the e®ort to avoid a large but sporadic
bad event, the anti-crisis measures implicit in rule 2019/95, introduce some
features which are not necessarily the most desirable. The previous section
highlighted some of them:
² It is costly, hoovering around 4% of the statutoru capital of commercial
banks.
² It shows a poor correlation between the required reserves and the av-
erage maturity of loans in the 1-60 day range.
² Makes transitory shocks larger and more persistent.
4.1 Why not doing it all over again?
Between a complete overhaul and doing nothing, there is a wide spectrum
of minor changes that can be done. In fact, it is very likely that the author-
ities would like to try ¯rst some small changes before travelling the road of
re-engineering. There may be some good reasons for that:
29The high political cost of un-doing. Implementing and enforcing a reg-
ulation as cumbersome as this one required a good deal of negotiations
between the Central Bank and its commercial counterparts. Eliminat-
ing or replacing the existing rules by others entirely new could mean
re-starting the whole process of lobbying and explaining, at the risk of
ending up with something worse than what is there today.
Lack of clarity. Not having very clear how far the regulation goes and what
are its precise macro and micro e®ects would also make the authorities
hesitant on what parts of it need to be changed or adjusted.
Administrative costs of changing the rules. Every new rule means changes
to reporting and accounting systems within the banks and at the Cen-
tral Bank. It also entails the training of supervisors, compliance o±cers
and operators. Taking a sharp turn in the basic philosophy of the rules
could bring about very high transition costs without having the cer-
tainty that the new rules will work better than the older ones.
Easier to undo. Last, but not least, when changes are small, they can be
undone at a lower political and operational cost.
Now, assuming that there may be a greater temptation on the side of the
parties involved to build upon the current rules rather that changing them
altogether, the practical question would be how to adapt, or patch them in
a way that e®ectively addresses its current shortcomings.
4.2 Desirable characteristics for a patch
Without trying to exclude any other features that the policy maker may
¯nd desirable, one could think of the following:
Preserve the capacity to cover the "risk". Namely, one would be look-
ing for a rule that keeps much of the capacity of the banks to face a
sudden stop in the availability of funding from abroad, whereas trying
to include features that more closely re°ect the relationship between
cost and risk. For example, it follows from section 3.2, that rule
2019/92 would tax almost the same a bank with much of its liabilities
maturing in 8 days and bank with their liabilities maturing in 60 days.
30Minimize side e®ects. The amplitude and persistence of the low frequency
harmonics brought about by the regulation seem to generate a poten-
tial interference with other elements of the monetary policy, namely in
the foreign exchange rate front. A good characteristic of the regulation
would be for it to work well in times of stress and to create as little as
possible cost during better times.
The signal processing approach o®ers a rather standard methodology for
designing patches. Namely, if the policy maker is not in a condition to modify
the ¯lter that transforms the input signal in any substantial way, the idea
would be to attach another LTI ¯lter at the exit of the existing one in order to
get a newer and improved output signal. In the time domain notation , this
would be to de¯ne an impulse-response polynomial that would be convolved
with the current output signal.
The practical, yet not necessarily substantive, advantages of this approach
are that the regulator would only need to add one paragraph to the regulation
that would instruct bankers and supervisors to keep calculating the same
formula, and once they are done, to substitute to the result in a rather
parsimonious di®erence equation.
4.3 Designing and implementing the patch
With the aforementioned criteria in mind, one could think of adding a
¯lter to the system that eliminates must of the low frequency harmonics, and
keeps some and most of the mid-range and high frequency ones. Intuitively,
this approach could simultaneously address both the two points of concern
highlighted in section 4.2. That is, by making the burden of the rule more
progressive (i.e. A lower weight is given to funding shocks that may have
an e®ect later into the future), one would reduce the persistence seen in the
currently regulated environment. To implement this idea we proceed along
the following steps:
Getting a Normalized Filter The next ¯gures show one simple LTI ¯lter
that would eliminate all high-gain and low-frequency spikes of the older
¯lter for reserves; to abate the gain in the mid frequency range and to
keep the high frequency properties of the regulation intact.
The parameters of the patch are set to get an ipulse-response poly-
nomial of order 60 built using an Equirriple normalized multi-band
31method with an ideal weight of 0 percent for periods of less than two
weeks, 50 percent up to one month; of 70 percent for periods between
one and 2 months and 100 percent beyond that. Notice that this design
says nothing about the phase of the frequency response for the patch,
and that does not consider any feedback between the existing and the
older ¯lter. The reason is that the current ¯lter is causal, stable and
with minimal phase, as it was shown in section 3.3.4.
















































Figure 17: Patched Filter Design
Restoring the Power Since the elimination of the low, and some of the
mid-range frequency harmonics also takes some of the power of the
original output series, it would be reasonable to scale up the magni-
tude of the frequency response of the patch by a factor that makes the
area under the power spectrum equal for both, the original and patched
outcome signal. The upper panel displays the realizable patch ¯lter once
the adjustment is made ( U(ej!)) .29 The lower panel shows the mag-
nitude of the resulting frequency response , jU(ej!jjY (ej!)j=jX(ej!)j.
The impulse-response of the patch Now, we will just repeat what was
done in section 3.3.4; namely, starting from the frequency response
function; then, obtaining the z-transform and, from there deriving the
29We mean that a ¯lter is realizable if it is stable and causal.
32corresponding impulse response function. As we know, the latter is
just the polynomial of weights in a distributed lag ¯lter applied to the
output signal coming from the current regulation. Figure 18 displays
the coe±cients b(k) in equation 7. In this case a(k) = 0 for all k .











Figure 18: Unit impulse response for the Patch
Simulating the patched outcome Figure 19 shows a resulting signal for
liquid assets and the net position after applying the patch.The data
generating process behind this simulation exercise is the same used in
section 3.2.


























































Figure 19: Input and output signals
33For comparison purposes, the panels in the left correspond to the orig-
inal output signals. The modi¯ed rule adds, as it was expected, less
amplitude and persistence.
Coverage of the patched regulation One interesting way of seeing what
this patch does is to look at the coverage of liabilities by liquid assets,
in the same fashion as we did in ¯gure 8.
This time, as can be seen in ¯gure 20, the patched series shows a very
similar level of coverage for short term shocks, and a clearly decreasing
coverage as we move to longer term liabilities.

















Required Reserves to Total Liabilities
Figure 20: Patched Coverage of Liabilities by Reserves
An interesting twist to this result is that it is very likely that we would
have reached the same outcome by adjusting some of the parameters in ¯gure
2, for example the gain coe±cients before the RALMux. However, it is
my impression that the full dynamic consequences of doing that were less
obvious, and involved more parameters than the approach followed here.
Notwithstanding, one could bene¯t from going back and forth the calibration
of parameters in the system and the design of patch, until ¯nding the solution
that is easier to implement.
34Concluding remarks
This document talks about two things. On the one hand, there is the
methodological issue about using Signal Processing tools for regulation anal-
ysis and implementation. On the other hand, at least it raises the question
of why regulations, like the one used here as an example, are implemented.
With respect to the methodological considerations, perhaps one could say
that as rules get more complicated, it is useful to have some sort of diverse
and well known tools, like the spectrum, the impulse response function and
the zero-pole plots to evaluate and adjust rules, when the purpose of the
policy maker is to make some minor adjustments. Maybe the example is
not beyond the reach of conventional tools, but thinking of tax laws or some
rules for the operation of the payment systems, could make these tools more
attractive and useful.
Beyond that, there are more fundamental issues need discussion. Namely,
why authorities like the Mexican ¯nd necessary to segment the peso and dol-
lar markets in the way they do it. Furthermore, why treat the convertibility
risk any di®erent than the traditional risk of facing a bank run. Therefore,
why not having in place an incentive compatible deposit insurance mecha-
nism, very much like the one in operation for balances in local currency. Or,
why not reducing the lender of last resort responsibilities of Banco de Mexico
by allowing branches of foreign banks to operate 30in the Mexican market. 31
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